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NOTES
Pregnancy Disability Benefits Denied: Narrowing
the Scope of Title VII
In a recent decision the Supreme Court held that a private
employer's disability benefits plan which excluded pregnancy
benefits was not discriminatory under Title VII. Although pur-
porting to apply traditional Title VII standards, the Court in fact
used an equal protection analysis. The author criticizes this ap-
proach and points out the Court's failure to consider facts critical
to a comprehensive analysis of the issue.
Seven employees of the General Electric Co. instituted a class
action' against General Electric in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief and damages, alleging that General Elec-
tric had engaged in sex discrimination violative of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The employment practice attacked as
unlawful under Title VII was the exclusion of pregnancy-related
disabilities from General Electric's short term non-occupational
sickness and accident disability plan. The District Court found the
exclusion to be the result of deliberate sex discrimination. ' On ap-
peal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed, pronouncing General Electric's policy to be discrimination
that was "inextricably sex-linked" in its consequences.' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held in the first preg-
nancy case it decided under Title VII, reversed: General Electric's
exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its temporary disa-
bility plan does not constitute gender based discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S.Ct. 401 (1976).
1. The district court certified two classes. All female employees of General Electric
employed on or after September 14, 1971 constituted the class seeking injunctive and declara-
tory relief. The sub-class suing for damages was comprised of female employees denied preg-
nancy disability benefits beginning September 14, 1971. Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 375
F.Supp. 367, 369 (1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
3. 375 F.Supp. at 386.
4. 519 F.2d 661, 664 (1975).
5. There was strong congressional disapproval immediately following the General
Electric decision. The Senate passed an amendment to Title VII which essentially overrules
the Gilbert decision. 123 CONG. REC. S15059 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1977).
A New York case decided after General Electric held the denial of disability benefits to
private pregnant employees to be unlawful under the state's Human Right's Law which is
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The integration of women into the labor force on a parity with
men has been an arduous process. The familiar maxim, "a woman's
place is in the home," has been so ingrained in our perception of
family life that the working woman has been traditionally consid-
ered an anomaly. It is axiomatic that the capacity of the female to
become pregnant and bear children has forged the concept of the
misplaced woman in the working world who will retire permanently
once her children are born. This perception continues to be re-
flected in the inferior economic position occupied by the female
worker7 notwithstanding her sometimes superior educational back-
ground.8 Employers have historically justified the economic dispar-
ity between male and female employees on the basis of the transient
nature of women in the work force. However, such transience is
often the direct result of restrictive employment practices applied
exclusively to women.' While the fourteenth amendment, the Equal
Pay Act,'0 and Title VII have eliminated many employment prac-
tices which penalize women because of their child bearing potential,
some discriminatory practices have continued.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted by Con-
gress to remove the impediments to employment opportunities that
exist for individuals because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
worded similarly to Title VII. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 84, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding the constitutionality
of an Oregon statute limiting a female employee's work day to ten hours because of her
"maternal functions"); Hodgson v. National Bank of Sioux City, 460 F.2d 57, 62 (8th Cir.
1972) (where the employer admitted maintaining a policy which precluded female employees
from joining a management training program because of the possibility of marriage and a
family).
7. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 294, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN
WORKERS at 178 (1969).
8. The median income for fulltime female employees in the United States is 58.5% of
that of comparable male employees. H. REP. No. 92-238, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in
[19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2140.
9. Employer practices relating to pregnant employees, such as termination and forced
maternity leave with loss of seniority status, have caused transiency by female employees.
See Hearings on H.R. 3861 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 139,
194, 243, 252, 258-59 (1963); Hearings on S. 882 and S. 910, Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Labor of the Comm. on Labor (Public Welfare) 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 142, 145 (1969); 100
CONG. REC. 9205; Brief For Respondent at 116, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S.Ct. 401
(1976). For a discussion of discrimination against pregnancy see Koontz, Childbirth and
Leave: Job-Related Benefits, 17 N.Y.L.F. 480 (1971); Comment, Love's Labors Lost: New
Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 HARV. Civ. Lie. L. REV. 260 (1972).
Currently 60% of all private employers provide six weeks of disability benefits for preg-
nancy. Brief For Respondent at 52. If the General Electric decision had gone the other way,
this coverage would have had to be increased to the number of weeks of coverage provided
for other temporary disabilities (generally twenty-six weeks).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
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national origin." Title VII is a legislative mandate to private em-
ployers to consider the capabilities of individuals when making
employment decisions rather than basing such decisions on unjusti-
fied group stereotypes. In order to effectuate its goal, Congress
passed comprehensive legislation to eliminate discrimination that
might exigt in every phage of the employment scheme including the
compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.' 2 In
11. H. REP. No. 914, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2401 (1964). See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801, 806 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-
30 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971); Note, Developments
in Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1109, 1175 (1971). There is virtually no legislative history surrounding the inclusion
of sex as a protected class under Title VII. The proposal for the addition of sex to Title VII
was prompted by the hope that the addition would insure defeat for the entire bill. See 110
CONG. REc. 2577 (1964); Comment, Sex Discrimination Unemployment: An Attempt to Inter-
pret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 676-77. For the legislative
history of Title VII, see Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INC. & CoM. L. REV. 431
(1966). However, extensive congressional hearings dealing with sex discrimination were held
in conjunction with the passage of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), one year prior to the
Civil Rights Act. The legislative history of the Equal Pay Act is a useful aid in construing
congressional intent of Title VII. Legislative History of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (printed
for use of Committee on Education and Labor) S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 687
(1963). See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 519 F.2d at 667 n. 22; Schultz v. Wheaton Glass
Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (reading the statutes
in pari materia); Brief for Respondent at 120-28, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S.Ct. 401
(1976); Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of the
Law for Women, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 326 (1971); Kanowitz, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 305, 344-46 (1968); Margolin, Equal
Pay and Equal Opportunities for Women, N.Y.U., 19th Conference on Labor, at 297 (1967).
Furthermore, it would be anomalous to distinguish the congressional purpose of Title VII as
it relates to sex from the other classes in view of the inclusion of sex on a parity with the
other classes throughout the statute. See Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,
507 F.2d 1084, (1975) where the court stated: "The language of the Supreme Court in Griggs
regarding racial discrimination applies with equal (but not greater) force to sexual discrimi-
nation. ... 507 F.2d at 1091; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971). "In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes." Kanowitz, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 305, 312 (1968).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The subsection states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
General Electric argued that incidents of a job such as employee benefits are less significant
than employment opportunities and are, therefore, accorded less protection under Title VII.
Brief For Petitioner at 53-54, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S.Ct. 401 (1976). However,
the statutory language specifically includes benefits of employment and indicates no discrep-
ancy in the protection provided by Title VII between job benefits and job opportunities. In
addition, the Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a)(b)(1973),
issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dealing with fringe benefits pro-
vide that:
19771
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1972 Congress amended Title VII to extend its protection to state
employees to insure that all individuals belonging to a protected
class receive individual assessment of their capabilities in the em-
ployment world. 3
Under Title VII an employer is prohibited from implementing
employment practices which discriminate against employees be-
longing to a protected class. An employment practice is discrimina-
tory under Title VII standards when it differentiates between em-
ployees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The courts have recognized that such discrimination may be appar-
ent on the face of the employment practice or that a discriminatory
intent may lie behind a facially neutral employment practice. Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. "1 clearly
articulated a third touchstone for determining discrimination in a
Title VII case. Although a practice may be neutral on its face and
in its intent, if it has differential impact on a protected class it
violates Title VII. Thus, a plaintiff in a Title VII case need not show
discriminatory intent to establish a prima facie violation if the dis-
criminatory effect of the challenged practice can be demonstrated.
Upon a showing of a prima facie violation of Title VII the only
defenses available to the defendant-employer are the statutory bona
fide occupational qualification defense,' 4 ' which has been strictly
construed, and the judicially created business necessity defense. 4 .
In contrast to the three-pronged discrimination test of Title VII,
equal protection analysis requires a two-pronged test whether under
the fifth or fourteenth amendment. Since Title VII is a statute
(a) "Fringe benefits," as used herein, includes medical, hospital, accident, life
insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.
If employers were permitted to differentiate the quality and quantity of employment benefits
provided to employees with the same jobs on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, the purpose of Title VII would be circumvented. Although individuals belonging to
such groups would be provided with the same job opportunities as others, the benefits and
other conditions surrounding their employment could be made so inferior to those provided
non-minority employees that they would be induced not to accept the job or to leave the job.
Inferior job benefits would cause financial hardship for minority group workers that is not
experienced by similarily situated non-minority employees. Thus, an employer could accom-
plish indirectly what he could not do directly. Title VII protection does not cease with
providing a protected individual with an equal opportunity to obtain a given job, but rather
requires that all employees are entitled to the same benefits incident to that given job to
insure the complete integration of minority groups into the labor force.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)-(b), (Supp. 111972) amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)-(b) (1970).
14. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14.1 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) (1970).
14.2 See note 66 infra.
[Vol. 32:173
NOTES
specifically enacted to alleviate discrimination in the world of pri-
vate employment, and equal protection is a constitutional concept
designed to protect citizens from all acts of discrimination by fed-
eral and state governments, the judicial analysis employed in alle-
gations of violations of the two must necessarily differ. Last term
in Washington v. Davis'" the Supreme Court noted the difference
between the Title VII and equal protection standards of discrimina-
tion and held that, unlike Title VII cases, a showing of discrimina-
tory effect was insufficient to establish a violation of equal protec-
tion. A plaintiff in an equal protection case must evidence discrimi-
natory intent in order to demonstrate that a facially neutral practice
is discriminatory.
In addition to the dichotomy that exists in establishing discrim-
ination under Title VII and equal protection, the analysis also dif-
fers once discrimination has been demonstrated. Unlike Title VII
which provides limited defenses, a discriminatory practice may be
upheld under equal protection analysis depending on the class in-
volved. Classifications by race, color, religion or national origin can
be justified only by a compelling state interest employing the least
restrictive means of promoting that interest.' 5 .' Gender classifica-
tions in the past have been subjected to minimal scrutiny which
involves a legitimate state interest using means rationally related
to further that interest.'5" However, the present judicial standard in
sex cases appears to be a hybrid form of analysis, a "strict rational",
which focuses on whether the classification used by the legislature
bears a "fair and substantial relation to the object of regulation."' 5
15. 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976).
15.1 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). For
classifications by religion, see United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947)
(dictum) (religion and race).
15.2 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
15.3 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. vv. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). For a discussion of this new form of judicial scrutiny, see Gunther,
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Kahn v. Shevin-Sex: A Less-Than-Suspect Classification, 36 U.
Pint. L. REV. 584 (1974); Note; Kahn v. Shevin and the "Heightened Rationality Text": Is
the Supreme Court Promoting a Double Standard in Sex Discrimination Cases, 32 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 275 (1975); Gender in Sup. Ct. 1973 & 74, Sup. CT. REV. (1975). In Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality of the Court found classifications based upon
sex to be suspect triggering strict judicial scrutiny. All other recent cases, however, have been
examined under the hybrid type of judicial scrutiny. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S.Ct. 1021
(1977); Craig v. Boren, 97 S.Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (irrational
classification under any test). For a general discussion of the Court's treatment of sex discrim-
ination, see Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
235 (1975); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 617 (1974).
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The essential difference between the Title VII and the equal protec-
tion analysis is that a state may lawfully engage in practices which
have a discriminatory impact (if discriminatory intent is absent)
and further may, depending on the class and circumstances, be
justified in engaging in discriminatory practices (either on their face
or intent) because of its responsibility to promote the social welfare
of its citizens. However, a private employer is prohibited from en-
gaging in practices which have a discriminatory impact on a pro-
tected class unless the circumstances absolutely compel such dis-
parate treatment and the practice involved produces the least
amount of discrimination possible under the circumstances.
We turn now to an examination of the cases involving employ-
ment practices relating to pregnant women analyzed under the dif-
fering standards of equal protection and Title VII.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,'0 the Supreme
Court was faced with the problem of deciding the constitutionality"
of a school board regulation which required a pregnant teacher to
go on unpaid maternity leave from the end of her fourth month of
pregnancy until three months after the birth of her child. The Court
found that the mandatory leave policy constituted an arbitrary cut-
off date violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Such a regulation created an irrebuttable presumption that
all pregnant teachers were incapacitated five months before the
expected births of their children.' " In addition to precluding individ-
ual determination of physical ability, the regulation unduly bur-
dened a female's constitutionally protected right to bear a child.'9
Last term the Court carried the reasoning of LaFleur one step
further in Turner v. Department of Employment Security and
16. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
17. Since the plaintiffs in LaFleur were placed on maternity leave prior to the extension
of Title VII to state agencies, the attack was on the constitutionality of the regulation under
the fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, Justice Stewart, the author of the opinion, noted
the applicability of Title VII and the EEOC's guidelines to similar suits in the future. 414
U.S. 632, 638 n.8 (1974). Justice Stewart cited 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973) which provides that
a mandatory leave or termination policy because of pregnancy presumptively violates Title
VII.
18. Justice Powell concurred in the result but felt that equal protection analysis was
appropriate. Furthermore, he found the gender classification to be irrational and never
reached the problem of which standard of analysis was required for equal protection. 414 U.S.
at 651.
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the use of the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine as an attack on the legislative process itself. He maintained that since physical impair-
ment increases as pregnancy advances, the legislature is free to draw the line as it did in
LaFleur. 414 U.S. at 657.
19. 414 U.S. at 640, 651. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1941).
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Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah.0 In a per
curiam opinion the Court held a provision of the Utah unemploy-
ment compensation law violative of due process. The law denied
unemployment benefits to pregnant women who had stopped work-
ing for reasons unrelated to their pregnancy, for a period beginning
twelve weeks before and extending to six weeks after their expected
date of delivery. As in LaFleur, this provision created an irrebutta-
ble presumption of physical impairment for a period of eighteen
weeks. Due process, stated the Court, requires individual treatment
when the basic freedom of procreation is at issue."'
The corollary problem to forced maternity leave settled in
LaFleur and developed in Turner is whether pregnant employees on
maternity leave are entitled to disability payments pursuant to
their employer's disability plan. The issue first arose in Geduldig v.
Aiello2 which involved a temporary disability plan administered by
the state of California for the benefit of' private employees." The
plan was wholly financed by employee contributions with no in-
volvement by the private employers. The plan covered disabilities
arising from a substantial number of mental and physical illnesses
and injuries, but precluded coverage for disabilities accompanying
normal pregnancy.24 The Supreme Court upheld the statute and
found that there was no invidious discrimination violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." Traditional
20. 96 S.Ct. 249 (1975).
21. 96 S.Ct. at 250-51. The state argued in Turner that the provision in issue was merely
the result of the financial inadequacy of the state to cover all unemployment compensation
rather than unavailability of benefits based on pregnancy. The Court rejected this argument
because it was only raised on appeal. 96 S.Ct. 249, 250 n.* (1975). It is this type of argument,
however, which the same Court accepted twelve months later in General Electric. See the
discussion infra in the text.
22. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
23. Participation in the plan was mandatory if the private employee was not covered by
a state approved private plan. Each employee contributed one percent of his salary up to a
yearly maximum of $85. Temporary disabilities incurred which were not covered by Work-
men's Compensation were covered for up to twenty-six weeks beginning on the eighth day
after the disability began or on the first day of hospitalization, whichever came first. All
payments were made from employee contributions and the amount of the payments corre-
sponded to the contributions made by the particular employee receiving benefits. CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2626, as amended by § 2626.2.
24. Originally the plan precluded coverage for any injury or illness caused by or arising
in connection with pregnancy until a lapse of twenty-eight days following termination of the
pregnancy. Three of the original plantiffs who experienced complications during abnormal
pregnancies were denied coverage. Prior to adjudication by the Supreme Court, however, the
California statute was ameded so that only disabilities associated with normal pregnancy
were exempted so the issue was moot as to three of the original plaintiffs.
25. Title VII was inapplicable in Geduldig because it involved a state disability plan for
private employees. Title VII covers state employees receiving disability benefits from the
state or private employees receiving such benefits from their employers.
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equal protection analysis" was employed by the Court: since the
state of California had a legitimate interest in maintaining the fiscal
integrity of the program, the exclusion of one risk of disability,
pregnancy, was a rational means used by the legislature in promot-
ing that interest." The problem with the Geduldig analysis, how-
ever, is that the Court failed to unambiguously state whether the
pregnancy classification created by the California statute consti-
tuted a gender-based classification or merely a classification by
physical condition." Justice Brennan, in his dissent,29 construed the
majority opinion as finding the plan's exclusion of disabilities re-
sulting from normal pregnancy to entail sex discrimination. His
criticism of the opinion lay in the use of the rational basis test to
evaluate the validity of the statute. He felt that prior cases man-
dated that a stricter standard of judicial scrutiny be applied to the
sex classification and that the statute could not survive such a
heightened scrutiny. ° The majority confined its rebuttal of Bren-
nan's dissent to a footnote,3' and indicated that the pregnancy clas-
26. See note 15.2 supra, and accompanying text.
27. 417 U.S. at 496.
28. See generally Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Defi-
nition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 441 (1975); Note, Pregnancy and Sex-Based
Discrimination in Employment: A Post-Aiello Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 57 (1975).
29. 417 U.S. at 497 (joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall).
30. 417 U.S. at 502-04. Brennan cited Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), as requiring a stricter standard for evaluating a legislative
classification based on gender. Brennan reiterated his position in Frontiero that classifica-
tions based on gender, like race, were inherently suspect. 417 U.S. at 503. See note 15.3 supra
and accompanying text. Brennan cited with approval the EEOC guidelines promulgated in
connection with Title VII, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972), which state disabilities caused by
pregnancy should be treated as other temporary disabilities for all job-related purposes. 417
U.S. at 502.
31. The dissenting opinion to the contrary, this case is thus a far cry from
cases like Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, (1973), involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The California
insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of
gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of
compensable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant
it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex-based classification like those considered in Reed, supra, and Frontiero,
supra. Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with
unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy
are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the mem-
bers of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or
exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable
basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The
program divided potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes
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sification created by the California statute was not gender-based
but rather a classification involving a physical condition. Since
there was no showing that the pregnancy exclusion was a "mere
pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination" 2 against
women, the Court determined that the exclusion did not violate the
fourteenth amendment. By not clearly stating whether pregnancy
classification is a gender-based classification, the Court left the cen-
tral issue unresolved.
The Geduldig decision provided that a state disability plan
created for the benefit of private employees could legitimately ex-
clude disabilities related to normal pregnancy. However, it left un-
answered the question of whether a private employer could exclude
coverage from a similar plan pursuant to Title VII. The five courts
of appeals3 3 which have dealt with this issue have found such disa-
bility plans to violate Title VII. The Supreme Court34 found
Geduldig to be dispositive and thus found the challenged General
members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus
accrue to members of both sexes.
417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20.
32. Id.
33. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego
School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975) (both these cases dealt with the disallowance of
use of accumulated sick leave during maternity leave but the courts treated the issue as
analogous to the exclusion of pregnancy from a disability plan); Gilbert v. General Electric
Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Communications Workers of America v. A.T.&T. Co., 513
F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated
on juris. grounds, 424 U.S. 736 (1976). Satty, Hutchinson, Communications Workers and
Wetzel distinguished Geduldig on the grounds that it involved a constitutional issue in
contrast to a question of statutory interpretation. Furthermore, the courts cautioned against
overemphasis of the importance of Geduldigs footnote 20. The Court of Appeals in General
Electric read Geduldig as finding that sex discrimination resulted from the California disabil-
ity plan but that the discrimination was justified within the social and welfare context from
which it arose. 519 F.2d at 666-67.
In addition, in Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1975), which involved
the constitutionality of the Georgia bar examination, the court stated that the standards for
determining discrimination under Title VII and the fourteenth amendment differ. The Tyler
court specifically cited the failure of the Geduldig Court to discuss the relationship between
the Title VII and fourteeth amendment standards as support for its position that the Title
VII standards are irrelevant in determining the constitutionality of an allegedly discrimina-
tory state practice. See also Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975)
(employer policy of discharging pregnant employees constitutes unlawful sex discrimination
under Title VII). For a discussion of the interplay of the Equal Rights Amendment with
pregnancy classifications see, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Defini-
tion of Sex Discrimination, 75 COL. L. REV. 441, 471-81 (1975). For a projection of the effect
of the Equal Rights Amendment, see Parts IV and V of Brown, Emerson, Falk, Freedman,
The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE
L.J. 871, 909-80 (1971).
34. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, Powell, and Stewart (concurring). Justice Blackmun concurred in part.
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Electric plan in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert lawful under Title
VII.1
The Court begins its examination of the GE plan" by determin-
ing whether the plan is facially discriminatory. Since
"discrimination" was left undefined by Congress when it enacted
Title VII, the Court reasons that the judicial construction given to
it under the equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment
could be utilized in discerning its meaning for Title VII purposes.
Therefore, the gender discrimination analysis of Geduldig which
dealt with a similar disability plan37 is apposite. The Court relies on
footnote twenty" to read Geduldig as standing for the proposition
that a virtually all inclusive disability plan which excludes preg-
nancy from its coverage is a classification based upon a physical
condition rather than gender. 9
Since the GE plan, like the California plan in Geduldig, created
no distinction between the coverage provided to both sexes for the
included disability risks, the Court concludes the plan is facially
neutral. 0 In addition, the Court characterizes pregnancy as being a
"unique" and voluntary condition' distinguishable from other cov-
ered disabilities.2 Therefore, the exclusion of pregnancy-related dis-
abilities by General Electric was not a "simple pretext for discrimi-
nating against women." 3 Although the Court recognizes that a
35. A discriminatory employment practice based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin is a prima facie violation of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1970). Generally, such
discrimination can be established by a showing that the challenged employment practice is
discriminatory on its face, in its intent, or in its effect. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). A prima facie case can be rebutted by demonstration of a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification or business necessity.
36. The General Electric Weekly Sickness and Accident Insurance Plan (General Elec-
tric is in effect self-insured) provided payments in the amount of sixty percent of the em-
ployee's weekly wages up to a maximum of $150 per week for virtually all nonoccupational
disabilities except those which were pregnancy-related. In contrast, the California plan in
Geduldig (see n.23 supra) only excluded disabilities arising from normal pregnancy; the
General Electric plan excluded all pregnancy related disabilities. Payments under the GE
plan continued for up to twenty-six weeks beginning on the eighth day of disability or the
first day of hospitalization, whichever occurred first.
37. 97 S.Ct. at 407.
38. See n.3 1 supra.
39. 97 S.Ct. at 407-08.
40. 97 S.Ct. at 408.
41. Id. The district court found that pregnancy was usually voluntary, although a sub-
stantial number of pregnancies were accidental or resulted through negligence. The district
court also found pregnancy was not a disease per se. 375 F. Supp. 367, 377 (1974).
42. 97 S.Ct. at 408. The Court found that exclusion of pregnancy related disabilities from
the facially neutral plan was based on a neutral criterion rather than a discriminatory intent
which would have violated Title VII.
43. Id. This was the intent test enunciated in Geduldig for finding a sexually neutral
classification to violate equal protection. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
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prima facie violation of Title VII can be established by proof of the
discriminatory effect" of a facially neutral plan-even in the ab-
sence of dicriminatory intent 45-the Court does not apply the effect
test in any discernable manner."
Since the Court never makes the threshold finding that the
General Electric plan constitutes sex discrimination, there can be
no finding of an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. The
Court buttresses its holding by rejecting the guideline promulgated
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the
agency charged with interpreting Title VII,47 which states that disa-
bilities due to pregnancy should be treated as any other temporary
disability for purposes of disability plans.4" The Court does not at-
tach great weight to the EEOC guideline in determining the legisla-
tive intent of Title VII because of the guideline's inconsistency with
the prior position taken by the EEOC.49 Furthermore, the Court
notes the eight year lapse from the time of the statute's enactment
until the guideline's issuance.50 Finally, the Court cites a conflicting
regulation issued by the Wage and Hour Administrator under the
Equal Pay Act 5 as a justification for rejecting the EEOC guideline.
44. 97 S.Ct. at 408-09 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
45. To establish that a facially neutral classification violates equal protection, proof of
a discriminatory intent is necessary. Washington v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2051 (1976).
46. The portion of the opinion which purports to apply the effect test merely expounds
on the Court's discussion of the facial neutrality of the plan.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. VI 1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970). The Court
distinguished EEOC guidelines from those issued pursuant to enabling statutes. 97 S.Ct. at
411.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973). The EEOC guideline provides that:
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disabil-
ity insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. Written
and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as ...
payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan,
formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth
on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabili-
ties.
49. See letter by General Counsel of EEOC (10/17/66), EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE, (CCH),
17,304.43 (1970).
50. The Court cited Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) as providing the
test for the amount of weight to afford the guideline. To be considered are 1) "the thorough-
ness evident in its consideration; 2) the validity of its reasoning; 3) its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements; and 4) all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control." The Court rejected the guideline on the basis of factor 3 and totally
disregarded factors 1, 2, and 4. See note 102 and accompanying text infra.
51. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1975) provides:
If employer contributions to a plan providing insurance or similar benefits to
employees are equal for both men and women, no wage differential prohibited by
the equal pay provisions will result from such payments, even though the benefits
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Justice Stevens' dissent52 does not come to grips with the ap-
proach taken by the majority. The issue presented in the case as
perceived by Stevens is purely one of statutory interpretation, un-
complicated by the social and precedential underpinnings apparent
in the majority"3 opinion and the powerful dissent written by Bren-
nan. Stevens finds Geduldig inapposite because it is based on the
fourteenth amendment which, he maintains, requires more strin-
gent standards of proof to make a prima facie case of discrimination
than does Title VII. 4 By rejecting the cornerstone of the majority
opinion, Stevens is free to proceed without confronting the argu-
ments presented by the majority. Since the GE plan singles out only
risk of absence due to pregnancy for differential treatment and only
women can become pregnant, Stevens finds the plan to be facially
discriminatory. By concluding that the plan is facially discrimina-
tory, Stevens avoids dealing with the effect test enunciated in
Griggs" and the weight to be accorded the EEOC guideline. The
which accrue to the employees in question are greater for one sex than for the
other. The mere fact that the employer may make unequal contributions for
employees of opposite sexes in such a situation will not, however, be considered
to indicate that the employer's payments are in violation of § 6(d) if the resulting
benefits are equal for such employees.
The Court noted the relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. See n.11
supra. Furthermore, under Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), an employer does
not violate Title VII if he differentiates the amount of compensation provided on the basis of
sex as long as he does so in accordance with § 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)
(1970).
52. 97 S.Ct. at 420-21.
53. 97 S.Ct. at 406. The Court recognized the finding of the district court, 375 F.Supp.
at 378, that the inclusion of pregnancy benefits would increase General Electric's disability
plan costs by a substantial amount. The justification for the California plan in Geduldig was
premised on the increased cost which would result from the inclusion of such disabilities. 417
U.S. at 492-94.
54. 97 S.Ct. at 420. Stevens relied on Washington v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976).
55. General Electric did not plead a defense, (neither bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion or business necessity), so Steven's analysis ends once he has found that the GE plan
entails sex discrimination.
56. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs test is applied to an
employment plan which, although neutral on its face, is alleged to violate Title VII because
of its discriminatory effect on a protected class. As Stevens noted, a plan which distinguished
absences on the bases of neutral criteria such as voluntariness or overwhelming cost, would
be analyzed under the Griggs test to determine if it had a discriminatory impact. The GE
plan was not based on such criteria. Although the majority distinguished the plan as not being
discriminatory in intent, the reasoning is erroneous. Not only did the GE plan include some
voluntary disabilities, see n.69 and accompanying text infra, refuting any claim of voluntari-
ness as a criterion for the pregnancy exclusion, but "sex-plus" distinctions are also violative
of Title VII. Employment practices which distinguish between employees on the basis of
gender, plus an additional characteristic, constitute sex discrimination. Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding an employer could not refuse to hire women with
pre-school children when men with pre-school children were hired); Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding an employment practice of discharging
married stewardesses while maintaining married male flight attendants violated Title VII).
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Griggs test is applied to an employment plan which, although neu-
tral on its face, is alleged to violate Title VII because of its discrimi-
natory effect on a protected class.
Brennan's masterful dissent 57-in contrast to Stevens' more
simplistic approach- confronts the majority on a point to point
basis. Brennan acknowledges that the conceptual framework used
by the majority is diametrically opposed to that used by the plain-
tiffs and ultimately adopted by him. The majority professes to look
at the GE plan as an arm's length contractual relationship adopted
through the process of collective bargaining in which the employees
are represented by unions, and, in which a series of benefits are
agreed upon. However, due to the financial constraints of the em-
ployer, both parties recognize that not all benefits desired by all
employees will become part of the final employment package.
Rather, only those benefits which the union considers most impor-
tant will be included.5" Therefore, the majority contends that to
determine if the plan is discriminatory the analysis must focus on
the benefits adopted rather than on those excluded. As Brennan
notes, such an approach allows any cause of disability unique to one
sex or race59 to be excluded from a disability plan without violating
Title VII provided that all employees could receive payments for
disabilities included in the plan.
Brennan rejects the majority interpretation of Geduldig and
states that at most Geduldig holds "that a pregnancy classification
standing alone cannot be said to fall into the category of classifica-
tions that rest explicitly on 'gender as such"'." Therefore, he views
Geduldig as having very limited application to the instant case. It
is puzzling that Brennan even makes this concession to the major-
ity. He appears to recede from his dissent in Geduldig which presup-
posed that the California disability plan created a gender-based
In addition, a proposed amendment to section 703 of Title VII which would have made
discrimination illegal only if based "solely" on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
defeated. 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964). So even if voluntariness was a neutral criterion upon
which the GE plan was based, this does not save the plan since pregnancy is sex specific.
For a discussion of "sex-plus" distinctions, see Comment, Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1171 (1970); 51 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 148, 160-62 (1976).
57. 97 S.Ct. at 413-20.
58. Although not expressly stated in the majority opinion, the concept of collective
bargaining and financial limitations faced by the employer is implicit in the decision. Indeed,
the Court relies on the financial aspects involved to bolster its holding. Such considerations
explain the approach of the Court in looking at the included benefits rather than those
excluded. See 375 F. Supp. at 370-71; Brief for Respondent at 54.
59. E.g., hysterectomy, prostatectomy, sickle cell anemia.
60. 97 S.Ct. at 414 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20).
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classification."' Furthermore, Brennan's statement about Geduldig
creates uncertainty as to when a pregnancy classification is to be
treated as a sex classification.
However one reads the Geduldig opinion there is another aspect
of the case that the majority fails to treat adequately. Geduldig
specifically left open the case where a pregnancy-related classifica-
tion for disparate treatment is used as a pretext for sex discrimina-
tion.2 Thus, a facially neutral disability plan would be impermissi-
ble if it evidenced a discriminatory intent. 3 The majority fails to
address the question of intent. Brennan concurred with the district
court finding that the evidence of General Electric's past and pres-
ent policies toward female employees revealed a discriminatory atti-
tude towards women and that this was a "motivating factor" in its
disability plan. "4
61. See n.30 supra.
62. In Geduldig the majority decided that evidence of discriminatory intent was absent.
For purposes of analysis in Gilbert, Brennan agrees that the California plan was the product
of neutral actuarial principles (97 S.Ct. 414), although in his dissent in Geduldig Brennan
specifically pointed out that the plan was not based on actuarial data since all the beneficiar-
ies of the plan contributed at the same rate, notwithstanding the difference in group. 417 U.S.
494, 499 n.2 (1974).
63. The part of the Geduldig opinion relating to discriminatory intent is consistent with
equal protection analysis. See Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Private suits challenging employment practices as discriminatory
under Title VII are based on § 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970), which provides equitable
relief in the event it is determined that the employer "has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in" an unlawful employment practice. Intent has not been construed
to mean subjective intent; rather objective intent. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791, 796 (4th Cir. 1971). The focus is on the consequences of a particular employment prac-
tice, not the motivation. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
64. 97 S. Ct. at 415 n.1 (citing 375 F. Supp. at 383). The district court found the General
Electric plan to be facially discriminatory. 375 F. Supp. at 380-82. The court noted that
General Electric had been aware of the EEOC guidelines and had failed to comply with them.
375 F. Supp. at 385. The court cited General Electric's past practices as evidence of discrimi-
natory intent. When General Electric instituted its disability coverage, it excluded female
employees because "women did not recognize the responsibilities of life, for they probably
were hoping to get married soon and leave the Company." 97 S.Ct. at 415 n.1 (citing D. LOTH,
SWOPE OF GENERAL ELECTRIC: STORY OF GERALD SWOPE AND GENERAL ELECTRIC IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS (1958)). General Electric had a policy of paying female employees two-thirds of the
wages paid their male counterparts. See General Electric Co., 28 War Lab. Rep. 666 (1945)
(quoting a General Electric job manual). The justification for this policy offered by General
Electric was the increased cost in employing females, including payment of pregnancy disa-
bility benefits which the company never paid. 97 S.Ct. at 415 n.1. In 1970 and 1971 the
straight time hourly wage rates of female employees was less than 75 percent than that of
males. Brief for Respondent at 50-51. Another policy of General Electric precluded the hiring
of pregnant applicants. Furthermore, until the Gilbert suit, General Electric had a six-month
mandatory leave policy for pregnant employees. 375 F. Supp. at 385. A male employee who
was partially disabled was accommodated by General Electric with a job he could perform,
but pregnant employees were not so accommodated, and had to go on unpaid leave. Brief for
Respondent at 86. While discrminatory practices prior to the implementation of Title VII
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Brennan points out that under the GE plan the male employee
is covered for all risks of disability which he might experience by
virtue of his gender. Yet, the female is not covered for all risks of
disability she might experience by virtue of her gender. Certainly,
one cannot logically conclude that because of the financial limita-
tions of GE which precluded the plan's coverage of every conceiva-
ble disability, GE's choice to exclude pregnancy rather than tonsili-
tis was based on a neutral assessment of the risks. 5 Nonetheless,
this is precisely the majority's contention. Indeed, GE feared dis-
criminatory intent would be found and, therefore, introduced data
which showed the increased costs which would result from the inclu-
sion of pregnancy disabilities in the plan."
The majority's conclusion that the GE plan does not evidence
a discriminatory intent is based on its finding that the plan is
(July 2, 1965) are not covered by that Act and may be irrelevant to prove discriminatory
intent, General Electric's employment practices after that date support the district court's
finding of discriminatory intent. The court of appeals did not consider the issue of discrimina-
tory intent.
65. Justice Brennan cited with approval (97 S. Ct. at 416) the district court statement
that: "[T]he concern of defendants in reference to pregnancy risks, coupled with the appar-
ent lack of concern regarding the balancing of other statistically sex-linked disabilities, but-
tresses the Court's conclusion that the discriminatory attitude characterized elsewhere in the
Court's finding was in fact a motivating factor in its policy." 375 F. Supp. at 383.
66. Cost considerations do not go to the issue of rebutting discriminatory intent. Such
data becomes relevant in the context of a business necessity defense. If a challenged practice
is neutral on its face and in its intent, an employer may plead business necessity to rebut a
prima facie case of a violation of Title VII established by a showing of discriminatory effect.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797 (4th Cir. 1971). General Electric did not plead
the defense of business necessity; however, the district court considered the data in that
context and noted that in addition to being an inappropriate defense (because the General
Electric plan was neither neutral on its face nor in intent), cost alone would not sustain the
defense. 375 F. Supp. at 382 (citing Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d at 799 n.8). The
test for business necessity enunciated in Robinson is whether there exists an overriding
legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary for the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be
sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice
must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there
must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would
better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well
with a lesser differential racial impact.
444 F.2d at 798. General Electric had a less restrictive alternative whereby the disability
payments could have been allocated in a manner that would not leave pregnant employees
totally unprotected. The district court noted the issue involved was not whether to force
General Electric to increase its cost for disability payments, but whether to require nondiscri-
minatory distribution of the payments. 375 F. Supp. at 382. The court of appeals found the
cost evidence irrelevant because it was not pleaded as a business necessity defense, and
because the court held that business considerations are insufficient to preclude a finding of
discriminatory intent. The court of appeals pointed out that Congress refused to recognize
such business considerations when it enacted the Equal Pay Act and similarly did not intend
to do so under Title VII. 519 F.2d at 667 n.23 (citing U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 687, 689 (1963)).
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merely the result of neutral criteria which distinguish pregnancy
from the covered disabilities. Brennan summarily dismisses volun-
tariness as a basis for distinction." Since the plan covers other vol-
untarily induced disabilities such as sport injuries, venereal disease,
and elective surgery, Brennan rejects this criterion as the basis of
GE's exclusion of pregnancy. Some of the examples chosen by Bren-
nan, however, are distinguishable from pregnancy on a voluntary
basis. When a woman chooses to become pregnant she is also volun-
tarily assuming the accompanying disability."8 But an individual
who voluntarily elects to participate in a given sport or to have
sexual relations does not contemplate incurring disabilities which
might result from such activity. However, the GE plan included
disabilities resulting from elective cosmetic surgery, hair trans-
plants, and vasectomies, which totally defeats the voluntariness
argument. Furthermore, the plan covered disabilities sustained in
a fight, as well as alcoholism and drug addiction. The claim that
pregnancy disabilities are excluded by General Electric because
they are voluntary and the above mentioned causes of disabilities
are covered because they are involuntary is tenuous at best."9
Another questionable conclusion by the majority is that preg-
nancy is unique because it is not a disease per se.7° There is an
abundance of feeling in the medical community that disabilities
caused by pregnancy are indistinguishable from those caused by
diseases;7 however, since the district court made a finding of fact
67. See note 41 supra.
68. The district court found normal pregnancy, including recuperation, to be disabling
for a period of six to eight weeks. 375 F. Supp. at 377.
69. General Electric argued pregnant employees could obtain abortions, citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), so continued pregnancy was voluntary. Brief for Petitioner at 64,
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). This reasoning undermines General
Electric's argument that conception is voluntary. Furthermore, since abortion is viewed as
immoral by many women, General Electric's voluntariness argument is dubious. Since most
women work because of need, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, Why Women Work,
(rev. ed. 1972) (quoted in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 502 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting)),
it is inconceivable that by its enactment of Title VII Congress intended women to choose
between going childless, even to the point of subjecting themselves to abortion, or giving up
their necessary income. See 375 F. Supp. at 381-82.
70. 97 S.Ct. at 408.
71. See 375 F. Supp. at 376. But cf., Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238
(N.D. Ga. 1973) (holding failure to provide disability payments for pregnant employees does
not violate Title VH). The Court stated that "pregnancy is neither a sickness nor a disability
. . .The fact of its existence demonstrates that a woman is quite healthy and normal .... "
Id. at 245-46. General Electric treated pregnancy as an illness for other aspects of its compre-
hensive employee protection plan. A voluntary leave of absence by a pregnant employee is
classified as Illness-Pregnancy and is treated as an absence due to illness except for disability
payments. GE Health Bulletin re pregnancy leave, issued 11/5/71; Brief for Respondent at
37-40.
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that pregnancy per se is not a disease, 2 the Court was constrained
by that finding. But beyond the mere labelling of the GE plan as a
sickness and accident plan, many of the covered disabilities similar
to pregnancy do not literally fall within those terms, e.g., vasec-
tomy, plastic surgery, attempted suicide, hair transplants, or inju-
ries sustained during a fight or the commission of a crime. Further-
more, Brennan notes the district court finding that approximately
ten percent of pregnant women experience physically disabling mis-
carriages, and another ten percent sustain serious complications
from pregnancy," both of which may be justifiably characterized as
diseases which are not voluntarily assumed, yet both are excluded
from the GE plan. Of the latter ten percent, approximately five
percent entail diseases related to the physiological state of preg-
nancy, for example, toxemia, and the remaining five percent are
diseases experienced by nonpregnant persons but may be induced
by factors associated with pregnancy, such as weight gain, high
blood pressure, and diabetes.7 Nevertheless, the GE plan precluded
coverage for these diseases as well as for disabilities accompanying
normal pregnancy where the employee has already begun a period
of maternity leave.75 The majority avoids this issue entirely and by
so doing illogically uses Geduldig as precedent upon which to base
their holding. Geduldig specifically dealt with a disability plan
which omitted coverage for disabilities arising from normal preg-
nancy only. It appears highly imprudent to use Geduldig as a catch-
all for all pregnancy-related disabilities without discussing the
twenty percent of pregnancies which are abnormal, especially in
light of the way the GE plan works. Under the plan, the moment a
female employee begins maternity leave, she is not entitled to any
disability payments. Therefore, if she experiences any disability
whatsoever, (not just the twenty percent discussed, supra) she re-
mains uncompensated. For example, if the pregnant employee is
involved in an automobile accident while on maternity leave, she is
precluded from receiving payments, but had she been involved in
the same accident while temporarily laid off from work or on per-
sonal leave, she would be entitled to disability payments. 7 In con-
72. 375 F. Supp. at 377.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 376-77.
75. One plaintiff took maternity leave then experienced a pulmonary embolism (blood
clot in the lung) which was unrelated to her pregnancy. She was denied disability benefits
by General Electric for the period of her disability caused by the embolism. 97 S.Ct. at 404
n.4.
76. In contrast, disability coverages would continue to include any non-pregnancy re-
lated disabilities occurring within thirty-one days after the employee went on leave because
of a layoff, strike or personal reason. Brief for Respondent at 13-15.
19771 NOTES
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
trast, a male employee temporarily laid off or on a leave of absence
would receive benefits for any disability he experienced within
thirty-one days of ceasing active work. Whatever arguments are
made by the majority to justify the exclusion of disabilities arising
from normal pregnancy, they are not viable for complications of
pregnancy or disabilities incurred while on maternity leave. The
Geduldig test for discrimination quoted throughout the majority
opinion is whether "[tihere is no risk from which men are protected
and women are not."" Surely, excluding coverage for women on
maternity leave for risks totally unrelated to pregnancy and cover-
ing men for such risks under all circumstances whether on leave or
not, flies in the face of the Geduldig test.
Brennan next addresses the most puzzling portion of the major-
ity opinion. In contrast to establishing a violation of equal protec-
tion, a Title VII violation may be established by the discriminatory
effect of a plan neutral on its face and in its intent.7" The majority
obscures its application of the Griggs effect test and appears to
refute its validity. Indeed, Justices Stewart and Blackmun, while
joining in the result reached by the majority, fail to concur in the
portion of the opinion which appears to refute the Griggs effect test.
Justice Stewart, however, disagreed with Justice Blackmun that
there was any suggestion of abandonment of the Griggs test.79 Griggs
involved the administration of an employment test and the require-
77. 97 S.Ct. at 409 (citing 147 U.S. at 496-97).
78. See Washington v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In McDonnell an employee claimed he failed to be rehired
because of racial discrimination in violation of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII. The Court stated
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination and such a case could
be established by showing:
i) that he belongs to a racial minority; ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802. The Employer must then establish a nondiscriminatory explanation for
failing to rehire the employee. The Court stated that the employee could introduce racial
statistics to establish that his rejection "conformed to a general pattern of discrimination
against blacks" by his employer. 411 U.S. at 802-05. The majority, 96 S.Ct. at 417, used a
"but cf.," citation to McDonnell after stating a violation of Title VII did not require proof of
discriminatory intent. As Justice Brennan points out, McDonnell allows proof of discrimina-
tory effect in a private non-class Title VII action. 96 S.Ct. at 417 n.6.
79. Justice Blackmun rejects any implication by the majority that the Griggs effect test
is no longer viable for determining Title VII discrimination; rather, he finds the plaintiffs
failed to prove discriminating effect. Justices Blackmun and Stewart concurred in the major-
ity's result but refused to overrule the Griggs effect test. Their opinions are more puzzling
than the majority opinion, however: since the majority result can only be reached by refuting
the effect test, the Justices' opinions are illogical.
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ment of a high school diploma by a private employer for purposes
of employment and transfer. The Court found a prima facie viola-
tion of Title VII since the requirements precluded a dispropor-
tionate number of blacks. Proof of discriminatory intent was
deemed unnecessary by the Court when the consequences of the
employment plan operated "invidiously to discriminate on the basis
of racial or other impermissible classification.""0
Furthermore, in Washington v. Davis,' decided just four
months prior to General Electric, the Court expressly stated "we
have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating
claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the stan-
dards applicable under Title VII and we decline to do so today." 2
Washington concerned the validity of a qualifying examination to
obtain employment as a police officer under the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals because it had applied the Griggs effect test to evaluate the
constitutionality of the facially neutral examination. The Court
held the disparate racial impact of the examination was insufficient
to prove a violation of the fifth amendment. A showing of discrimi-
natory intent on the part of the police department which the plain-
tiff failed to establish was necessary to activate strict judicial scru-
tiny of the challenged police procedure. The Court distinguished
Title VII by stating "under Title VII, Congress provided that when
hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially dispro-
portionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory pur-
poses need not be proved, and that it is an insufficient response to
demonstrate some rational basis for the challenged practices."
In light of the holdings in Griggs and Washington it seems
anomalous for the majority to employ a fourteenth amendment
standard to determine whether discrimination exists in a Title VII
case. 4 Under the guise of applying the Griggs effect test, the Court
in essence rejects the test as a tool for determining discrimination.
Adhering to its conceptual framework of focusing on the covered
80. 401 U.S. at 431. The employer in Griggs failed to establish the business necessity
defence because there was no showing the requirements bore a "demonstrable relationship
to successful job performance." Id.
81. 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976).
82. Id. at 2047.
83. Id. at 2051.
84. Justice Brennan criticized as superfluous and contradicted by Washington the ma-
jority implication that the fourteenth amendment standard of discrimination is coextensive
with the Title Vn standard. 97 S.Ct. at 417 n.6. Since the majority could have used the same
analytical approach and reached the same conclusion without such an assertion, Justice
Brennan appears correct. However, this dictum may be merely the foreshadowing of requiring
stricter standards of proof to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII.
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disabilities, the Court leaves itself no option but to find the GE plan
neutral in its effect. The majority simply reiterates the Geduldig
test" used for facial evaluation and relabelg it an "effect test."
Consequently, just as it finds the GE plan to be facially neutral, it
finds the "effect" of the plan to be neutral. 6 The Griggs test neces-
sarily requires an examination of the consequences of the GE plan
on female employees. Such an examination would look at the disa-
bilities which are excluded as well as included by the plan. Just as
one cannot look at an employment test determined to be facially
neutral and conclude there is no discriminatory effect because all
of the blacks who have qualified under the test have the same em-
ployment opportunities as the whites who have qualified, one can-
not say a disability plan which is determined to be facially neutral
is not discriminatory in effect because all disabilities qualifying
under the plan provide the same benefits to male and female em-
ployees. Discriminatory effect of an employment test means the
facially neutral employment test results in a disproportionate num-
ber of blacks failing it. Similarily, discriminatory effect in a pur-
portedly neutral disability plan means women face a dispropor-
tionate risk of uncompensated absence due to pregnancy. 7 Further-
more, there appears to be a fundamental error in the majority's
treatment of males and females equally with respect to disabilities
when, because of physical characteristics, disabilities incurred by
the two genders must necessarily differ.88 Sex discrimination results
85. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
86. 97 S.Ct. at 408-09. Justice Brennan noted the plan had three discernible effects. The
plan included: 1) all disabilities which may be incurred by both sexes; 2) all male-specific
disabilities; 3) all female-specific disabilities except for pregnancy. The majority failed to
consider the impact of the second and third effects. 97 S.Ct. at 417-18.
87. This becomes apparent upon consideration of the purpose of an employment benefit
plan, which is to protect the employee from financial disaster when she is unable to work.
The fact that not all female employees face the risk of pregnancy does not alter the conclu-
sion. Since only females are penalized by incomplete disability coverage, sex discrimination
exists. See Note, Title VII, Pregnancy and Disability Payments: Women and Children Last,
44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 381, 395 (1976).
For a discussion of sex discrimination under Title VII, see Comment, Sex Discrimination
in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE
L. J. 671.
Furthermore, in failing to consider the effect of the plan on employees who incur nonpreg.
nancy related disabilities while on maternity leave, the majority reaches the wrong conclusion
even on its own terms.
88. To avoid sex discrimination under Title VII an employer must treat his female and
male employees differently for some purposes, for example, maintaining separate facilities.
"To the extent the sexes are essentially different, an employer discriminates on the basis of
sex by requiring one sex to sacrifice the basic difference to a greater degree than he requires
of the opposite sex." 1968 DUKE L. J., supra note 87, at 692. This was the district court's
contention rejected by the majority that "if it [inclusion of pregnancy disability benefits)
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from the plan's failure to recognize the unique condition of preg-
nancy experienced by the female. Yet, it is precisely this uniqueness
that the majority uses as a basis for finding the plan to be neutral.A5
In support of its effect analysis, the majority refers to the
statistical data supplied by General Electric which indicated that
in the two previous years the average cost per insured female em-
ployee exceeded such costs for the male employee."a The district
court rejected General Electric's data as being inadequate to "draw
any precise conclusions as to the actuarial value of the coverage
provided under the- present plan . . ... " The majority uses the
negative inference of this statement to conclude "as there is no proof
that the package is in fact worth more to men than women, it is
impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this
scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do
not receive benefits.""2 In addition to the questionable validity of
the statistics introduced,93 the majority's reliance on this data is
be viewed as a greater economic benefit to women, then this is a simple recognition of
women's biologically more burdensome place in the scheme of human existence." 375 F.
Supp. at 383.
89. 97 S.Ct. at 410.
90. Id. at 405 n.9, 409.
91. 375 F. Supp. at 382-83. The district court considered the statistical data in the
context of the business necessity defense. Since General Electric did not plead the defense,
the court of appeals considered the data irrelevant. 519 F.2d at 667.
92. 97 S.Ct. at 409. The Court noted that General Electric was not required by law to
supply any disability benefits to its employees. Therefore, if General Electric terminated its
disability plan and paid all its employees a flat increase (which was the cost of the disability
insurance), no discrimination would exist, although female employees would have to pay
more than male employees to procure comprehensive disability insurance. 97 S.Ct. at 409-10
n.17. (But General Electric did not pay a flat fee for employee insurance coverage as a self-
insurer and the company made payments on the basis of individual claims.) The fallacy with
this argument is twofold. Even though Title VI does not require an employer to adopt
particular employment practices, once he does so, such practices may not be discriminatory.
Furthermore, while insurance companies may validly draw distinctions on the basis of ac-
tuarial data using sex as a factor, private employers under Title VII may not necessarily do
the same. See 84 HARV. L. REv. at 1172-76. In Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 45 U.S.L.W.
2286-87 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 1976), the Ninth Circuit found an employment practice which
required female employees to contribute fifteen percent more than their male counterparts
to a retirement plan, on the basis of their greater life expectancy, unlawful under Title VII.
Since the actuarial distinction was based wholly on sex, the plan precluded treating each
employee as an individual, which is required by Title VII. For a discussion of insurance
classifications by sex, see Comment, Gender Classifications in the Insurance Industry, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1381 (1975); Bernstein & Williams, Title Vlland the Problems of Sex Classifi-
cations in Pension Programs, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (1974).
93. The district court stated, "(tihe Court gives no weight to the suggestion that the
actuarial value of the coverage now provided is equalized as between men and women." 375
F. Supp. at 382. General Electric's calculations were based upon the premise that although
the average duration of claims for both sexes were comparable, the average cost per female
was higher because more females were absent. The amount of disability payments actually
paid, however, was higher for a disabled male employee than a female employee. The average
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inconsistent with the recognized purposes of Title VII. If Title VII
mandates that employment policies reflect individual treatment for
employees rather than the imputation of group statistics to an indi-
vidual employee, there is something inherently wrong with allowing
an employer to refuse to cover an individual employee for a disabil-
ity because members of her sex, on the average, receive as much in
disability payments as their male counterparts. Furthermore, when
the only statistics used by General Electric to differentiate group
costs are based on gender rather than neutral criteria such as age
and occupation level, the inescapable conclusion is that the result-
ing disability plan has a differential impact on the two sexes. In
effect, the majority has written "effect" out of this Title VII case.
Brennan maintains that since discrimination has no absolute
meaning, but is rather defined in a social context, it must be exam-
ined in view of the social goals contemplated by the Civil Rights
Act. 4 Such goals comport with considering the unique situation
encountered by protected individuals. Brennan refers to Lau v.
Nichols,95 which concerned the alleged unequal educational oppor-
tunities for Chinese speaking students, who failed to receive English
language instruction. The Court held that the failure of the school
board to provide adequate instruction to deal with this disability
deprived the students of a meaningful opportunity to participate in
the public education program and violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.96 In addition, reacting to the courts' refusal to
require accommodation for employees' religious needs by employ-
ers, Congress recently articulated the need for such accommodation
by amending Title VII.9 7 Since Congress had intended such accom-
modation from Title VII's inception, the amendment has been ap-
plied retroactively by the courts." In light of the foregoing, it ap-
pears that the Title VII concept of non-discrimination towards
women includes employee treatment consistent with their unique
female employee's salary was lower, because females occupy lower level jobs at General
Electric. Studies show that employees who occupy lower level jobs have a greater rate of
disability claims. See S. RIESENPELD, TEMPORARY DISABILITY INSURANCE 84, 84-6 (University of
Hawaii, Legislative Reference Bureau Report No. 1, 1969); Brief for Respondent at 145-51,
58-59 n.16.
94. 97 S.Ct. at 419-20.
95. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
96. Id. at 568; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972): "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."




physical characteristics, especially where, as in the instant case, the
employerhas accommodated all the uniquely male characteristics. 9
Brennan's final argument deals with the majority's rejection of
the EEOC guideline as a proper interpretation of the congressional
intent behind Title VII. In the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Con-
gress recognized that discrimination is often manifested in subtle
forms. Therefore, it entrusted the detection of discriminatory em-
ployment practices to the expertise of the EEOC. °00 In view of the
conspicuous lack of legislative history surrounding the inclusion of
sex within the ambit of Title VII, views of the administrative agency
charged with interpreting the Act should be given due regard. Bren-
nan notes several Supreme Court cases which have held that EEOC
guidelines are entitled to "great deference."'' In contrast to the
majority, Brennan views the time lapse between the enactment of
Title VII and the promulgation of the EEOC guideline as necessary
for the detailed economic and social analysis engaged in by the
EEOC in formulating the guideline. Furthermore, he cites the in-
consistency of the EEOC's prior position with the guidelines as a
meritorious consequence of the in depth analysis undertaken by the
EEOC.' '2 Brennan contends that the EEOC wished to avoid the
premature imposition of the requirement that employers include
99. Ree 97 g.Ct. at 420; note 88 supra.
100. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2144.
Employment discrimination as we know it today, is a far more complex and
pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject generally describe the
problem in terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply intentional wrongs
.... In short, the problem is one whose resolution in many instances requires
not only expert assistance, but also the technical perception that the problem
exists in the first instance, and that the system complained of is unlawful.
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
101. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971).
The Court rejected an EEOC guideline in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973),
because it found the guideline to be clearly inconsistent with congressional intent. Espinoza
involved the interpretation of "national origin" in Title VII. The EEOC guideline prohibited
employer discrimination on the basis of citizensip. Since Congress enacted a related section
banning discrimination on the basis of national origin under Title VII, intending to follow
the historical practice of requiring citizenship for federal employment, the Court declined to
read a broader meaning into "national origin" for purposes of private employment.
102. 97 S.Ct. at 418-19; see 30 Fed. Reg. 14927 (1965), in which the EEOC prior to
promulgation of its sex discrimination guidelines stated that it had "little legislative history
to serve as a guide" and, therefore, would require extensive studies to determine the course
it would take to protect women. No guidelines on pregnancy were promulgated by the EEOC
until 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972). The court of appeals had cited criticism of the EEOC
guidelines and had stated its decision was based not only on those guidelines but on its view
of congressional intent as clearly mandating similar treatment for both sexes under employ-
ment disability plans. 519 F.2d at 664-65 & n.12.
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pregnancy related disabilities in their plans and views the guideline
as comporting with recent governmental policies which seek to alle-
viate the financial strain encountered by the pregnant employee. 03
Such policies serve to promote the total integration of women into
the labor force, and promote the remedial purposes of Title VII.
The implications of the General Electric decision are manifold.
The case may represent the end of the Griggs effect test as a means
for establishing that a facially neutral employment practice violates
Title VII. Discriminatory intent, which entails a more difficult level
of proof than does discriminatory effect, would then become the
relevant test in Title VII actions. Thus, the standards for Title VII
and equal protection analysis would be analogous. Equating a con-
stitutional standard, which has heretofore been considered more
stringent, with a statutory standard will significantly reduce the
number of employment practices which can be successfully chal-
lenged. In light of Congress' broad design of Title VII, which was
intended to protect the employee from discrimination because of
group membership in all phases of the employment scheme, and
Congress' recognition that discrimination often manifests itself in
subtle forms, 04 the Court's construction of Title VII in a manner
which allows only the most blatant forms of discrimination to be
held unlawful conflicts with Congressional intent.
The General Electric decision may signify a court created di-
chotomy under Title VII. Since Griggs was a racial case, the Court,
consistent with equal protection analysis which accords race and
national origin classifications greater protection than gender classi-
fications, may limit the Griggs effect test to employment policies
which have a disparate impact on a racial group. Such a course
taken by the Court would contradict the express language of the
statute which equates employment practices which discriminate on
103. The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 351 (k)(2) (1970) includes
benefits for pregnancy under the definition of sickness. Guidelines paralleling those of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. I) were approved by Congress and the
President. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.57(c) (1976). The Office of Federal Contract Compliance
(OFCC) issued guidelines on pregnancy discrimination (3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974)) and companies
contracting with the government are required to act in accordance with executive' orders
prohibiting sex discrimination. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14304 (1967), amending
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965). These guidelines were unclear as to
whether pregnancy leave included eligibility for disability payments; new guidelines following
the EEOC guidelines have been proposed. See Proposed Revision of 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(h)(2),
38 Fed. Reg. 35,338 (1973). The United States Civil Service Commission regulations provide
that pregnant federal employees are eligible for sick leave. 5 C.F.R. § 630.401(b) (1977);
Federal Personnel Manual, Subch. 13, § 13-2 (April 30, 1975).
104. See note 100 supra.
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the basis of sex or religion with those relating to race or national
origin.
Finally, Griggs involved an employment test"5 and its prece-
dential value may be limited on that basis. Consequently, different
employment practices would be analyzed under different standards
withiji the same statutory scheme.
The most likely impact of the General Electric decision will be
to allow the courts to analyze employment practices which pertain
to pregnant employees under different standards than other em-
ployment practices: while the Griggs effect test will remain a viable
tool for the analysis of other Title VII cases," 6 a fourteenth amend-
ment standard of discrimination will be applied to those cases which
involve pregnant women. Thus, the test which the Court has an-
nounced to determine whether an employment practice discrimi-
nates against women itself is discriminatory.
BARBARA UNGAR ROYSTON
Defense of Entrapment Is Denied to a Defendant
Who Is Predisposed to Commit a Crime
In Hampton v. United States the Supreme Court held that the
defense of entrapment is not available to a defendant who pro-
cured contraband from a government agent if the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime. In this article the history of the
defense of entrapment and the reasoning of the divided court in
deciding the Hampton case are examined in detail. The author
concludes that the rule set by the Hampton case encourages vio-
lation of defendants' rights by police, and that legislative reform
may be necessary.
Charles Hampton made two sales of heroin to federal agents. The
heroin was allegedly' supplied to Hampton by a Federal Drug En-
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) dealt with employment tests. Griggs also dealt with
the requirement of a high school education for purposes of being hired or transferred.
106. A majority of the Court in General Electric still expressed support for the Griggs
test at least in some instances.
1. The defendant and the government witnesses related two significantly dissimilar ver-
sions of events to the jury. Defendant claimed that the DEA informant obtained the drug
(which defendant believed to be nonnarcotic) that defendant admittedly thereafter solicited
and sold. The government's witnesses testified that Hampton had obtained and supplied
what he knew to be contraband. The Supreme Court dealt with defendant's version for
purposes of the appeal, and went on to hold this "fact" legally insignificant.
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